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Abstract 
Inferring quality of labor suppliers is a challenge in 
the gig economy. Many online freelance job markets 
address this challenge by incorporating signals. We test 
effectiveness of two kinds of information signals as 
indicators of supplier quality: skill signal (which 
reflects suppliers’ skill and potential), and achievement 
signal (which reflects suppliers’ past achievement). We 
theorize that two job characteristics in cross-national 
labor demand settings strengthen effectiveness of these 
signals: job duration, and cultural distance. 
Econometric analysis on a dataset from a leading online 
freelance job marketplace containing information on 
jobs posted by buyers and completed by suppliers 
located across several countries supports our 
hypotheses. We find that both skill and achievement 
signals are more effective at inferring supplier quality 
in jobs involving longer duration, and in jobs involving 
greater cultural distance between buyers and suppliers. 
1. Introduction
Online freelance job markets (e.g., Upwork,
freelancer.com) have transformed the nature of labor 
markets by connecting buyers and independent labor 
suppliers located across the globe. Recent events, such 
as the COVID-19 pandemic, have accelerated the 
proliferation of such markets, making it incumbent upon 
buyers and sellers to seek strategies to be successful in 
these labor markets [1]. These  markets  “match buyers 
of electronically deliverable services with freelancers—
self-employed individuals or teams who offer their 
services on a per-job basis (p. 860)” [2], are an 
important component of the gig economy, which 
engages about 57 million Americans [3]. 
Despite their potential, online freelance job markets 
create significant strategic challenges for buyers in 
inferring the quality of labor suppliers, an important 
metric when sourcing services, for at least two reasons. 
First, because online freelance job markets offer a 
multitude of suppliers across the globe, there is high 
selection risk because suppliers are globally distributed 
and independent heterogeneous agents. Second, online 
freelance job markets are generally characterized by a 
lack of formal procedures or service level agreements 
[4]. Because the digital nature of the platform limits in-
person contact and hinders buyers’ ability to verify 
suppliers’ processes and quality of work in progress, 
there is a high opportunism risk [5]. Due to selection risk 
and opportunism risk, buyers find it challenging to 
assess a good match, and even when matches are 
formed, it is difficult for buyers to know precisely the 
quality of the labor supplier that they are hiring [6]. 
These risks are particularly salient given that online 
freelance job markets are global in nature and hence 
present cross-national labor demand settings. The 
significant cultural differences between suppliers and 
buyers can pose hindrances and cause divergent 
interpretations of requirements [7, 8], resulting in major 
challenges to the effective completion of jobs [9]. 
Further, because of the geographically dispersed nature 
of providers and suppliers, time differences across 
locations, and the digital nature of the job marketplace, 
there is a lack of transparency and greater difficult for 
buyers to monitor the progress of the jobs effectively. 
As a result, there are increased selection risks and 
opportunism risks, which imply that buyers may need to 
rely on signals embedded within the market [10]. When 
information about suppliers’ quality is limited and 
difficult to observe, signals are an effective and cost-
efficient way to alleviate uncertainty regarding labor 
supplier quality. Many freelance job markets provide 
signals that depict suppliers’ achievement and skills on 
their public profiles.  
Although signals can be used by clients to evaluate 
the quality of suppliers, there remains a lack of clarity 
regarding their usefulness as indicators of supplier 
quality in online freelance job markets, and the gig 
economy in general. For instance, according to a survey 
conducted by the European Union, although 51% of gig 
workers had indicated some level of signals (e.g., their 





skills) in an online freelance job market, only 36% 
believed that the signals were actually helpful to them 
to be more successful in the marketplace [11]. In 
addition, many clients also found that the signals were 
not reliable indicators of overall quality of gig workers. 
Further, different online freelance markets exhibit 
mixed evidence on the usefulness of signals on the 
platforms. For example, in 2019, Upwork removed most 
of the signals related to skills from its platform, only 
retaining a test for basic skills to be taken only by 
newcomers. In contrast, other platforms place more 
emphasis on skill signals by promoting their importance 
on the platform [11]. In other words, it remains unclear 
whether and under what conditions the signals are true 
reflections of labor supplier quality [2]. Specifically, 
signals of supplier quality are not verifiable because due 
to the distributed, remote, and global nature of online 
freelance job markets, there are limited opportunities for 
buyers to familiarize themselves with suppliers and their 
processes [4]. The lack of a consensus regarding 
effectiveness of signals suggests that there may be other 
contextual job conditions which either strengthen or 
impede their effectiveness.  
Against this backdrop, this study examines whether 
signals in online freelance job markets are effective 
indicators of supplier quality and whether the 
effectiveness of signals depends on job characteristics. 
We focus on two kinds of signals that are important to 
buyers and suppliers: signals that indicate potential of 
suppliers, and signals that indicate achievement of 
suppliers [12-14]. First, a common way that online 
freelance job markets incorporate signals of potential is 
by embedding signals in the platform that depict the 
skills of suppliers. Thus, we define skill signal as the 
verified information signal that emphasizes a supplier’s 
technical skills and process related knowledge. It is 
represented by benchmarking assessments of 
certifications and examinations. Second, a common way 
that online freelance job markets incorporate signals of 
achievement is by embedding signals in the platform 
that depict the achievement of suppliers such as their 
past performance [13]. Thus, we define achievement 
signal as the information signal that emphasizes the 
supplier’s fulfillment of past jobs within resource 
constraints of time and budget.  
Our key theoretical argument is that due to the nature 
of online freelance job markets and the cross-national 
labor demand settings they operate within, there are two 
salient conditions that influence the effectiveness of 
skill signals and achievement signals as indicators of 
supplier quality: cultural distance and job duration. 
First, online freelance job markets are highly 
decentralized because the digital nature of the platform 
facilitates transactions between globally dispersed 
suppliers and buyers. Hence, selection risk is higher in 
jobs in which there is higher cultural distance (which 
pertains to differences in cultural norms) between 
supplier and buyer. Second, online freelance job 
markets “represent the long tail of business service—
they allow buyers and suppliers to engage in small-scale 
projects that would not have been economical to 
outsource without the electronic medium (p.346)” [15]. 
Jobs with longer duration usually have larger scale and 
scope and require interconnected tasks typical of longer 
engagements, whereas online freelance job market 
suppliers have limited capacity to handle jobs of large 
scale and scope [16]. Hence, opportunism risk is higher 
in jobs with higher duration. We focus on cultural 
distance and job duration as conditions that influence 
the effectiveness of signals of potential and 
achievement.  
Formally, we pose the following research question: 
how do job duration and cultural distance between 
buyer and supplier influence the effectiveness of skill 
signal and achievement signal as indicators of supplier 
quality in online freelance job markets? We theorize 
that the effectiveness of skill signal and achievement 
signal as indicators of supplier quality is stronger for 
longer jobs and jobs characterized by greater cultural 
distance between supplier and buyer. We empirically 
test our hypotheses using a unique dataset collected 
from a leading online freelance job market of jobs 
conducted across several distinct buyer-supplier country 
tuples. Our analysis suggests that skill signal and 
achievement signal are more effective indicators of 
supplier quality in jobs of longer duration and jobs 
involving greater cultural distance. Interestingly, when 
not accounting for these conditions, achievement signal 
is an effective indicator of supplier quality, whereas skill 
signal does not indicate supplier quality.  
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1. Signals in Online Freelance Job Markets 
Scholars have investigated advantages and 
challenges of online freelance job markets from 
perspectives of both buyers and suppliers. First, buyers 
source labor in online freelance job markets not only to 
reduce costs but also for strategic reasons, such as 
flexibility [4]. Second, buyers face new challenges due 
to difficulty in handling suppliers and managing 
multiple tasks [17]. Hence, buyers develop capabilities 
to manage online freelance job market suppliers and 
tasks. Third, scholars have examined characteristics of 
jobs and auctions that influence suppliers’ bidding 
behavior (e.g., [18]).  
In absence of adequate formal communication and 
coordination mechanisms, signals explain the behavior 
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of parties [12, 19] and can be used by suppliers to 
convey information to buyers [20]. Recent research has 
examined issues related to signals as reputation 
mechanisms in online freelance job markets. For 
instance, capacity signaling by suppliers influences 
worker response to recruiter invitations [21]. Buyers in 
online freelance job markets place significant weight on 
seller reputations [2] and suppliers with low reputation 
ratings are less likely to be chosen by buyers Given the 
salience of signals, it is crucial for platform owners to 
institutionalize information or signals to help buyers and 
suppliers to make decisions [10]. 
Various types of signals and situations in which they 
are used are important for interpretations, although their 
relative importance and effectiveness may differ [22, 
23]. In the context of online freelance job markets, the 
effects of past performance signal on worker quality 
depend on the context of previous evaluations [13]. 
Similarly, the extent to which the volume of reputational 
rating influences the probability of winning the bid 
depends on whether the contract is an output-based or 
input-based contract [15]. Scant research has examined 
how the effectiveness of signals as indicators of supplier 
quality depends on specific job conditions.  
2.2. Selection Risk and Opportunism Risk 
Selection risk results from a buyer selecting an 
inappropriate or low-quality supplier for a job [2, 4]. 
Selection risks can be mitigated through appropriate 
care in the pre-contract phase in supplier selection, 
bidding, and quality assessments [24]. However, 
mechanisms such as elaborate contractual arrangements 
and relevant planning are not in place in many online 
freelance job markets.  
Opportunism risk results when suppliers are inclined 
to deliberately underperform or withhold resources or to 
utilize information gained through their relationship 
with the customer for their own benefit. Opportunism 
risk is traditionally addressed by emphasizing learning, 
extensive contract development, and management 
control mechanisms [25] that facilitate monitoring of 
suppliers. Other ways in which buyers mitigate 
opportunism risk include providing training or learning 
opportunities to suppliers, selecting pre-trained 
suppliers, selecting suppliers based on business 
familiarity, or designing detailed and measurable 
contractual terms. However, buyers in online freelance 
job markets rarely provide training or learning 
opportunities for suppliers [16] and are typically not 
equipped with process standards, formal employee 
management practices or processes to monitor suppliers 
[4]. Hence, selection and opportunism risks are critical 
in online freelance job markets and may deter optimal 
outcomes [2].  
Selection risk and opportunism risk are even more 
salient in jobs of longer duration and greater cultural 
distance between supplier and buyer. First, longer jobs 
require interconnected tasks or coordination of multiple 
skillsets typical of longer engagements, whereas 
suppliers in online freelance job markets have limited 
capacity to handle jobs of large scale and scope [16]. 
Moreover, buyers often assign jobs lacking clear details 
of scope and work expectations [4]. Thus, job duration 
accentuates the opportunism risk because longer 
duration allows suppliers more time to slack off and 
devote fewer resources to jobs. Overall, job duration is 
a relevant aspect in online freelance job markets where 
buyers cannot see the time and resources that suppliers 
devote to each task.  
Second, cultural distance, defined as the degree to 
which cultural norms differ between the countries of the 
supplier and buyer [26], arises in the online freelance 
job market context due to physical separation of supplier 
and buyer across countries and cultures. Cultural 
distance can lead to misunderstandings, act as a barrier 
to interaction between people, and result in 
preconceived notions about people from different 
cultures [27, 28]. Cultural distance results in 
coordination and control costs, communication 
difficulties between supplier and buyer, and subsequent 
mismatch of expectations during job execution, often 
resulting in failures [29]. Further, cultural distance 
hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of coordination 
and communication [30]. Due to these reasons, higher 
cultural distance increases the selection risk for buyers.  
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
Our research model and hypotheses are based on the 
premise that before hiring a supplier in an online 
freelance job market, a buyer observes information 
signals. We test whether and under what job conditions 
information signals are good predictors of supplier 
quality in the focal job, as evaluated by the buyer 
subsequent to completion of the focal job.  
2.3.1. Skill Signal and Achievement Signal as 
Indicators of Supplier Quality 
Signals help disclose private information to buyers 
and allow high ability suppliers to differentiate 
themselves from low ability ones [21, 31]. When 
capabilities of suppliers are not directly visible, signals 
help buyers to overcome problems associated with 
selection risks [32]. Information signals in online 
freelance job markets are key mechanisms for 
differentiation because signals should be indicators of 
suppliers’ expertise and quality [13, 15].  
Page 6585
First, skill signal suggests that the supplier performs 
jobs with competency reflected through certifications 
and exams. Skill signals in online freelance job markets 
are manifested through a supplier’s completion of 
technical and managerial exams, or assessment tests. 
These examinations and certifications verify that the 
supplier has higher technical and managerial skills. 
Suppliers with such verified knowledge credentials can 
potentially offer superior quality solutions to satisfy 
buyers’ needs [33]. Thus, buyers experience a lower 
materialization of selection risk and therefore tend to 
rate such suppliers higher at the end of the focal job.  
Second, the achievement signal suggests the goal-
focused nature of the supplier to complete jobs on time 
and within budget in the past [13]. High achievement 
signal enhances buyers’ trust in the efficiency and 
productivity of the supplier, because suppliers’ 
achievement signal illustrates their dependability and 
suggests a lower risk of opportunism. Thus, suppliers 
with high achievement signals are more likely to 
complete jobs on time and within budget and are thereby 
more likely to get better buyer evaluations.   
In sum, we expect that skill signal and achievement 
signal are effective indicators of supplier quality 
because by reducing selection and opportunism risks, 
they increase the likelihood of a supplier delivering a 
high-quality job. 
2.3.2. Signals as Indicators of Supplier Quality for 
Longer Jobs and Culturally Distant Participants 
Skill signal reflects the abilities of suppliers to 
handle technology-, task-, or work-related aspects more 
competently [34]. Long duration jobs in online freelance 
job markets are a challenge for suppliers due to lack of 
scale, standardized processes, and advanced 
coordination and communication mechanisms [16]. 
Suppliers with high skill signal are more likely to 
showcase their abilities in the job [20]. In longer 
duration jobs, suppliers need to possess more specific 
knowledge and techniques to manage the job and buyer 
interactions [33]. Hence, longer duration jobs benefit 
more from verified credentials of suppliers because 
buyers would have the perception that the verified 
knowledge and expertise are being applied to overcome 
difficulties and reduce errors during the longer job 
duration [35]. Further, in longer duration jobs, 
opportunism risk is higher because longer duration 
implies a greater chance that the supplier has more time 
to slack off or devote fewer resources to the job. 
Therefore, in longer duration jobs, skill signals have 
greater significance since buyers can rely on the 
supplier's verified credentials. Hence, we posit: 
Hypothesis H1a: In online freelance job markets, 
skill signal is a more effective indicator of the quality 
of suppliers in jobs with a longer duration than in 
jobs with shorter duration. 
In jobs involving higher cultural distance, buyers 
need to manage suppliers with differing beliefs and 
norms. Individuals’ misconceptions about other 
individuals at a greater cultural distance create biases 
and divergent interpretations that complicate 
understanding of the business problem [9]. Skill signals 
act as standard benchmarks of verified knowledge 
notwithstanding language, cultural barriers, and biases 
that may lead to selection risks. Skill signals indicate 
that the supplier has technical and managerial 
competency, as reflected through certifications or tests. 
Suppliers with higher skill signals are likely to have 
higher expertise levels and face fewer hurdles while 
interacting with buyers at a greater cultural distance. 
Suppliers with greater cultural distance require greater 
details about specifications and other aspects of the job. 
Hence, jobs involving greater cultural distances 
between buyers and suppliers are more likely to benefit 
from suppliers with stronger skill signal because such 
suppliers may be more likely to overcome biases by 
relying on their technical and managerial skills. Further, 
buyers will benefit from an objective representation of 
suppliers’ skills and knowledge, because skill signal 
will reduce any biases that buyers may have due to 
cultural differences with the supplier. Hence, buyers can 
rely on skill signals as indicators of supplier quality 
particularly under the condition of greater cultural 
distance, where selection risk is higher.  
Hypothesis H1b: In online freelance job markets, 
skill signal is a more effective indicator of the quality 
of suppliers in jobs involving higher cultural 
distance than in jobs involving lower cultural 
distance.  
Achievement signal indicates the extent to which the 
supplier has completed past jobs successfully on time 
and within budget. Effectiveness of achievement signal 
is higher in longer duration jobs, due to two reasons. 
First, in jobs with longer duration, there is a greater need 
for meeting clear deadlines and understanding buyers’ 
requirements for each deadline. However, there is also 
greater opportunism risk because suppliers may be more 
likely to slack off. Suppliers with higher achievement 
signal will likely have more frequent communication 
with buyers as a critical step towards meeting job 
timelines and budgets. Such communication between 
suppliers and buyers create complementary knowledge 
and understanding, which in turn is more crucial in long 
duration jobs where there is greater opportunism risk. In 
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such jobs, achievement signals are more likely to predict 
quality because of tendency of suppliers with such 
signals to meet job timelines and budgets. Thus, 
suppliers with higher achievement signal are likely to 
obtain higher evaluation of quality by buyers, especially 
in longer duration jobs. Moreover, achievement-focused 
suppliers tend to cultivate their relationship with buyers 
resulting in shared goals and sense of trust, which are 
essential for successful sourcing. Consequently, 
achievement-focused suppliers are likely to maintain 
good communication with buyers. This is particularly 
important in longer duration jobs where opportunism 
risk is higher.  
Second, a supplier with higher achievement signal is 
likely to guide the buyer through a long duration job due 
to the supplier’s ability to efficiently manage its 
resources. This guidance reduces uncertainty and 
anxiety during course of the longer job, enhancing the 
buyer’s confidence in supplier’s ability to eventually 
meet goals. This process reassures the buyer that the 
supplier is devoting adequate resources to the job. 
Salience and effectiveness of achievement signal as an 
indicator of supplier quality is thus higher in a longer 
duration job, where opportunism risk is higher. Hence: 
Hypothesis H2a: In online freelance job markets, 
achievement signal is a more effective indicator of 
the quality of suppliers in jobs with a longer 
duration than in jobs with shorter duration. 
We argue that achievement signal is a more effective 
indicator of supplier quality in jobs characterized by 
higher cultural distance due to two reasons. First, in jobs 
with higher cultural distance, there is a higher selection 
risk due to the difference in cultures. This, in turn, 
results in greater likelihood of disagreements on 
priorities [15, 29] and difficulties in negotiations 
regarding job specifications, thereby exacerbating the 
challenge to maintain focus on objectives. Therefore, 
activities that deviate from original specifications may 
arise, which result in time and budget overruns, causing 
low buyer evaluations of supplier quality. In presence of 
such potential distractions and difficulties, a high 
achievement signal by the supplier is more effective as 
it preempts the surge of deviating activities by focusing 
job priorities on completion within cost and time 
constraints. 
Second, due to higher cultural distance, buyers and 
suppliers are likely to have different communication 
styles, demands, and expectations [27], thereby 
resulting in higher selection risk. An achievement-
focused supplier is likely to adapt the jobs’ goals and 
direction, or even transform its services to provide 
value-added outcomes to customers effectively. As the 
achievement-oriented supplier focuses on providing 
services that satisfy customers’ needs and demands, 
buyers and suppliers will start sharing objectives. An 
achievement-oriented supplier is hence likely more 
valuable in jobs of higher cultural distance where there 
are more likely to be discrepancies in communication 
styles, demands, and expectations. Hence, we posit:  
Hypothesis H2b: In inter-organizational platforms, 
achievement signal is a more effective indicator of 
the quality of suppliers in jobs involving higher 




We collected data from a leading global online 
freelance job market. We used a time structure design 
relevant to the job progress to capture data and code our 
variables. Platform information signal variables were 
collected prior to execution of the focal job, whereas the 
dependent variable was collected after job completion. 
This temporal ordering significantly mitigates concerns 
of reverse causality. The jobs included categories such 
as web services, software, or mobile app development 
jobs. We collected information at the completion of each 
job. For suppliers, we again collected all information 
regarding all jobs completed by the supplier during this 
period. By following such a recursive process, we were 
able to gather all relevant information on jobs. Figure 1 
depicts the job progression over time in our context. 
This strengthens inference of temporal ordering because 
signals precede assessment of supplier quality. 
Figure 1. Time Progression of Jobs 
Although our initial dataset covers 6452 service 
jobs, after removing duplicates, incomplete jobs and 
jobs for which information was not completely 
available, the final dataset covers 5432 service jobs. The 
jobs were assigned by 3221 buyers across 64 countries, 
and completed by 642 suppliers from 49 countries, 




We created our variables from objective data 
available in the online freelance job market. We 
measure Skill Signal as a sum of the number of 
examinations completed by the supplier prior to the 
focal job. These exams included technical exams (e.g., 
programming exams) and process-related exams (e.g., 
employer orientation), and represent the extent to which 
skill signals are captured in the platform. We measure 
Achievement Signal by the product of the proportion of 
on-time, on-budget, and completed jobs by the supplier. 
For robustness, we also used the average of the 
proportion of on-time, on-budget, and completed jobs, 
and obtained similar results.  
A buyer announces a job with a description and 
tentative budget on the website, and then seeks, selects 
and awards the job to a supplier. The job start date and 
completion date are captured on the platform; we used 
the difference of these dates to compute Job Duration. 
We capture the country names of buyer and supplier for 
the focal job and use a standard measure to calculate 
Cultural Distance. Cultural Distance is operationalized 
to incorporate differences in national culture across 
dimensions of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation 
[26, 36] by adopting a widely used measure of Cultural 
Distance [26, 37]. This measure is calculated using 
Hofstede’s dimensions of culture. The index is based on 
deviation of the supplier’s country from the buyer’s 
country along five Hofstede [36] cultural dimensions. 
These differences are adjusted for differences in 
variance of each dimension and then averaged. Thus:  
where Cultural Distancejk is the cultural distance of 
country of supplier j from the country of buyer k; Iij is 
an index for ith cultural dimension of jth country; and Vi 
is the variance of the ith dimension. 
Buyer's evaluation score of supplier quality in the 
focal job is the measure of Supplier Quality, consistent 
with prior research [13]. After completion of the job, the 
buyer evaluates supplier quality across five dimensions, 
resulting in a quality score on a continuous rating scale 
ranging from 0 to 5. Buyer evaluations after job 
completion are widely used as a quality measure in 
online labor markets literature [13] and in other contexts 
[38]. This is an effective measure of quality of suppliers 
in online freelance job markets since buyer satisfaction 
is derived from services provided by suppliers. Quality 
of sourcing providers, encompassing strategic, 
economic, technological and social factors of job 
success is reflected in buyer evaluations. Service quality 
is reflected via service experience rendered by the 
supplier.  
We include a rich set of control variables. To 
account for supplier’s experience with the platform, we 
control for supplier’s average prior ratings across all 
jobs (Supplier Prior Rating), prior supplier experience 
as number of past projects completed by the supplier 
(Supplier Experience), and the number of prior reviews 
received by the supplier (Supplier Reviews). Since 
quality evaluations may be influenced by clarity of the 
job specification, we control for job specification clarity 
(Job Spec. Clarity) which is rated by the supplier on a 
scale of 0 to 5. We control for the extent to which the 
buyer may have under-bid or over-bid for the job 
relative to the average bid of other bidders for the same 
job (Job Bid Deviation). Further, we control for extent 
to which the job may have overrun or underrun its 
budget by measuring percentage difference between 
final job price and initial budgeted price (Job Price 
Diff.). We also use a dummy control for mobile apps 
related jobs (Mobile Job). Finally, we include dummy 
variables for buyer and supplier continents to control for 
geographical influences (Buyer Location and Supplier 
Location). We omit descriptive statistics and 
correlations due to space limitations (available from 
authors on request).  
4. Results
4.1. Estimation Results 
The dependent variable Supplier Quality is left-
censored at 0, and right-censored at 5. To account for 
double-censoring of the dependent variable, we use 
double-censored Tobit maximum likelihood estimator, 
which explicitly accounts for nonlinearity introduced by 
a double-censored dependent variable [39]. We specify 
the double-censored Tobit model equation as yi = β xi + 
εi, where β is vector of coefficient parameters, xi is a 
vector of independent variables, and εi is error term. The 
double-censored Tobit model supposes a latent 
unobservable variable yi*. The observable variable yi is: 
Where L and U are respectively the lower and upper 
bounds on yi*. 
Table 1 presents the results. Although we do not 
postulate hypotheses for unconditional effects, 
Achievement signal has a positive and significant 
coefficient (column 1, β = 1.22, p < 0.01), suggesting 
that achievement signal is an effective indicator of 
supplier quality. However, Skill signal (column 1, β = 
NS) has a non-significant coefficient, suggesting that 
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skill signal is not an effective indicator of supplier 
quality when one does not account for conditions of job 
duration and cultural distance.  
Table 1. Estimation Results 
1 2 








Skill signal   Job Duration 0.003** 
(0.001) 
Achievement signal   Job Duration 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Skill signal  Cultural Distance 0.08*** 
(0.02) 












Intercept and Controls Included Included 
Log pseudo-likelihood -2929.01 -2828.14 
F-statistic 6.76*** 7.25*** 
F-test 14.47*** 
Notes: (1) Obs.: 5432. (2) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
(3) Parentheses show robust standard errors clustered by 
supplier. (4) Dependent variable is log (1+ Supplier Quality). 
The interaction term (Skill signal  Job Duration) is 
positive and significant (column 2, β = 0.003, p < 0.05), 
consistent with H1a. This suggests that skill signal is a 
stronger indicator of supplier quality in longer duration 
jobs. The interaction term (Skill signal  Cultural 
Distance) is positive and significant (column 2, β = 0.08, 
p < 0.01), consistent with H1b. This suggests that skill 
signal is a stronger indicator of supplier quality in jobs 
with higher cultural distance.  
We find support for H2a, as the interaction term 
(Achievement signal  Job Duration) is positive and 
significant (column 2, β = 0.04, p < 0.01). This suggests 
that achievement signal is a stronger indicator of quality 
of suppliers in longer duration jobs. The interaction 
(Achievement signal  Cultural Distance) is positive 
and significant (column 2, β = 0.50, p < 0.01), 
supporting H2b. This suggests that achievement signal 
is a stronger indicator of supplier quality in jobs 
involving higher cultural distance. The main effect of 
Cultural Distance is negative and significant, implying 
that cultural distance hinders coordination effectiveness. 
Control variables are generally in expected directions. 
For example, supplier experience, supplier's prior 
reviews, and job specification clarity have positive and 
significant coefficients. 
Figure 2 illustrates the results graphically. At low 
levels of Job Duration or Cultural Distance, skill signal 
is not an effective indicator of quality (Figures 2a and 
2b). However, at high levels of Job Duration or Cultural 
Distance, effectiveness of skill signal as a signal of 
quality is high. At low Job Duration or Cultural 
Distance, achievement signal is a reasonable indicator 
of quality; however, at high Job Duration or Cultural 
Distance, effectiveness of achievement signal as signal 
of quality is substantially higher (See Figures 2c and 
2d). The graphs and marginal effects suggest that the 





Figure 2. Interaction Effects 
Interestingly, the coefficient of Achievement signal 
 Job Duration is higher than the coefficient of Skill 
signal  Job Duration (p < 0.05), suggesting for longer 
duration jobs, Achievement Signal is more effective than 
Skill signal as an indicator of supplier quality. Likewise, 
the coefficient of Achievement Signal  Cultural 
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Distance is higher than the coefficient of Skill Signal  
Cultural Distance (p < 0.01), suggesting that for jobs 
involving higher cultural distance, Achievement Signal 
is more effective than Skill Signal as an indicator of 
supplier quality. These results suggest that in jobs with 
higher duration or higher cultural distance, Achievement 
Signal is more effective than Skill Signal as an indicator 
of supplier quality. 
4.2. Accounting for Endogeneity of the Signals 
       A potential concern in our study may be that the 
signals are endogenous. Such endogeneity can occur if 
there are unobserved (to the researcher) factors that 
affect the level of supplier signals as well as supplier 
quality. We took two approaches to address this 
concern. First, we accounted for potential endogeneity 
by using Garen’s methodology which is a residual 
analysis technique to correct for selection bias [40]. We 
estimated the first stage regressing Signals on factors 
likely to impact the extent to which suppliers signal (eq. 
i). We then calculated residuals ῆ from the first stage, 
and included ῆ and interaction term ῆ × Signals as 
endogeneity correction terms in the quality equation (eq. 
ii). ῆ corrects for selection bias, and ῆ × Signals accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity over the range of the 
selection variable [40]. The equations are:    
Stage 1: Signals = f (βa+ βrW + η)           .. (i) 
Stage 2: SupplierQuality= f(independent variables, 
interaction terms, ῆ, ῆ  Signals, controls, ε)  .. (ii) 
Where W is the vector of variables in the first stage; 
η and ε are error terms, and ῆ is the estimate of residuals 
from the first stage. Supplier and job characteristics are 
used as regressors in the first stage. 
The first stage model is significant and the second 
stage addresses endogeneity by including endogeneity 
correction terms calculated from the first stage. Our 
results (omitted for brevity) are unchanged, suggesting 
that the findings are robust to endogeneity.  
Second, we accounted for endogeneity using an 
extension of Garen’s model for scenarios with multiple 
potentially endogenous variables. With this approach, 
results are retained and omitted for brevity. 
4.3. Additional Robustness Checks 
We conducted several additional tests to assess 
robustness of our results. First, we used an alternate 
measure of cultural distance, based on Euclidean 
distance. Findings remained qualitatively unchanged. 
We repeated the analysis using only the first four of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (instead of five) and 
found similar results. Likewise, we repeated the analysis 
using the original Kogut and Singh [26] index without 
adjusting for variance of each dimension and found 
unchanged results. For robustness, we repeated the 
analysis by computing Achievement Signal by using the 
average of proportion of on-time, on-budget, and 
completion rate (rather than the product). Results were 
unchanged. Second, we assessed sensitivity of our 
results to clustering by suppliers and buyers and results 
are qualitatively unchanged. Further, results with and 
without clustering of standard errors remain similar. We 
repeat the analysis using endogeneity-corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares models instead of Tobit models 
and got unchanged results. Third, variance inflation 
factors indicated that multicollinearity is not 
problematic. Finally, as an additional control variable, 
we included the number of past transactions between the 
same buyer and supplier. We found similar results.  
5. Discussion
5.1. Findings 
Our study has several key findings. First, we find 
that achievement signal is an effective indicator of 
quality, implying that suppliers with high achievement 
signals (signals indicating completion of past jobs on-
time and within-budget) performed focal jobs well to get 
high evaluations of quality. In contrast, without 
accounting for job characteristics, skill signal is not an 
effective indicator of supplier quality.  
Second, our results suggest that the effectiveness of 
achievement signal as an indicator of supplier quality is 
amplified in jobs that are of longer duration and higher 
cultural distance. Third, we find that skill signal is an 
effective indicator of supplier quality in jobs of longer 
duration and jobs with higher cultural distance. This 
result is salient because it points to the key importance 
of skill signals in these conditions (long job duration and 
high cultural distance), although skill signals are not an 
effective indicator of quality without accounting for 
these conditions. In addition, we compared the 
difference in the coefficients of the interaction terms and 
found that in jobs with longer duration or higher cultural 
distance, achievement signal is more effective than skill 
signal as an indicator of supplier quality. Hence, for jobs 
of long duration or high cultural distance, buyers would 
be better off by relying on the achievement rather the 
skill signal of suppliers to infer quality. Overall, our 
findings point to achievement and skill signals as 
effective solutions to the challenge of inferring labor 
supplier quality in online freelance job markets.  
5.2. Theoretical Contributions 
Our study offers two key theoretical contributions. 
First, we contribute to literature on online freelance job 
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markets by highlighting conditions under which signals 
of skill and achievement are effective in conveying 
quality of suppliers. Prior research lacks a consensus on 
signal effectiveness in online freelance job markets [2, 
15] and studied signals from agency affiliation,
evaluations, past performance signal [13] and capacity
signaling [21] perspectives. Prior research also calls for
studying the influence of various kinds of signals and
how conditions related to country of origin or job
characteristics influence effectiveness of signals [15].
We contribute to this conversation by offering a 
novel perspective of specific job conditions in which 
skill signals and achievement signals are more useful 
indicators of supplier quality ― a key challenge in 
cross-national labor demand settings in freelance job 
markets. Job characteristics in such markets have a 
salient influence on effectiveness of signals as indicators 
of supplier quality. In jobs of high duration or cultural 
distance, buyers benefit from observing suppliers’ skill 
signals and achievement signals, which allow buyers to 
make more accurate inferences about supplier quality. 
Long duration jobs are characterized by high 
opportunism risk due to high likelihood that suppliers 
may slack off on delivering quality.  
Likewise, due to the global nature of online 
freelance job markets, jobs of high cultural distance are 
subject to higher selection risk due to the greater 
likelihood that cultural differences lead to biases and 
misconceptions. Hence, in jobs of high duration and 
cultural distance, which respectively pose high 
opportunism risk and selection risk, it behooves buyers 
to pay attention to achievement signal and skill signal as 
indicators of supplier quality. For suppliers, it is crucial 
to be aware of the importance of skill and achievement 
signals in terms of how their quality will be judged by 
buyers. Suppliers can take appropriate steps to 
strengthen their signaling, since effectiveness of signals 
is substantial, particularly in job conditions of longer 
duration and higher cultural distance. The implications 
of these findings are profound for prior and future work 
with supplier quality as a phenomenon of interest. Prior 
work [e.g., 2, 15] can be revisited as it is plausible that 
the results may have been influenced by a combination 
of job characteristics and supplier signals. Future work 
must incorporate these combinations of signals and job 
characteristics both conceptually and empirically. In 
sum, we complement and contribute to the stream of 
research on freelance job markets in gig economy by 
uncovering specific contextual influences of signals in 
such settings.  
Second, our study provides a novel perspective 
related to the seminal work of Spence [41] in context of 
online freelance job markets. Spence [41] suggested that 
job candidates (signalers) obtain an education to signal 
their quality and reduce information asymmetry. 
However, in online freelance job markets, education 
credentials (skill signal) may fall short in signaling 
actual quality of signalers (suppliers). The effectiveness 
of skill and achievement signals as indicators of supplier 
quality is not straightforward as we counter-intuitively 
found that skill signal is not effective in explaining 
supplier quality without accounting for job conditions, 
whereas achievement signal is an effective indicator. 
Thus, skill signals may not always predict actual 
supplier quality. Psychology literature suggests that 
people often prefer potential over achievement when 
evaluating others in offline contexts [14]. However, to 
the extent that skill signal reflects supplier potential 
whereas achievement signal reflects supplier prior 
achievement, our findings suggest that in digital 
platforms, achievement matters more than potential.  
5.3. Managerial Implications and Conclusion 
Our study has key managerial implications. First, it 
points to how signals of achievement and skill in online 
freelance job markets mitigate a strategic challenge that 
buyers encounter when leveraging these online 
freelance markets, especially in jobs of high duration or 
cultural distance. Our results help online freelance job 
market buyers interpret signals and infer supplier quality 
considering job conditions. Second, the study 
underscores job duration and cultural distance as key 
boundary conditions for effectiveness of signals in 
online freelance job markets. Third, our study has 
implications for signal provisioning in online freelance 
job markets as a relevant platform design problem. 
Platform designers may need to focus on devising 
appropriate achievement signals that highlight on-time 
and within-budget completion of jobs.  
To conclude, given the salience of online freelance 
job markets in global labor markets, our findings are 
valuable to infer supplier quality based on information 
signals under conditions of job duration and cultural 
distance in cross-national labor demand settings. 
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